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Abstract
Field-of-study mismatch occurs when a worker, trained in a particular field, works in
another field. This study draws on the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) to explore how
skill supply and labour market demand dynamics influence mismatch. It updates
cross-national estimates on mismatch and estimates the mismatch wage penalty.
Findings suggest that around 40% of workers are mismatched by field at their
qualification level, 11% overqualified in their field and 13% overqualified and
working outside their field. The saturation of the field in the labour market and
the transferability of the fields’ skills predict the incidence of field-of-study
mismatch and overqualification. Workers who are mismatched by field only
suffer a wage penalty if they are overqualified.
JEL Classification: J24, J31
1 Introduction
Field-of-study mismatch occurs when a worker, trained in a particular field, works in another
field (e.g. a worker trained in the law, business and social sciences field works in the service
sector, or, as Sloane (2003) illustrates, that of an English major working as a statistician). Con-
ceptually and empirically, field-of-study mismatch is distinct from qualifications mismatch in
that a worker may be matched to the job in terms of the quantity of schooling received
(qualification match) but not by the type of schooling received (Sloane 2003; Robst 2008;
Quintini 2011a). Seen this way, field-of-study mismatch is a form of horizontal mismatch
while qualification mismatch is a form of vertical mismatch (Verhaest et al. 2013). In studying
field-of-study mismatch, the literature has generally ignored how skill supply and skill demand
dynamics influence mismatch and the relationship between horizontal and vertical mismatch
in the wage penalty associated with field-of-study mismatch. Using the Survey of Adult Skills
(PIAAC), an internationally comparable survey of adult skills, this paper addresses both gaps
and updates cross-national estimates of field-of-study and qualificationmismatch.
2 Background
Field-of-study mismatch occurs when a worker, trained in a particular field, works in another
field. Also referred to as horizontal mismatch, it is distinct from qualification (vertical) mis-
match in that aworkermay bematched to the job in terms of the quantity of schooling received
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(qualification match) but not by the type of schooling received (Sloane 2003; Robst 2008; Quin-
tini 2011a). Field-of-study mismatch may be one of the reasons behind qualification mismatch
(e.g. if there is no work in their particular field, jobseekers may have to downgrade to find a job),
but only a part of field-of-study mismatch can be considered qualification mismatch (Ortiz and
Kucel 2008; Quintini 2011a; OECD 2016).
Workers’ qualifications and field-of-study are proxies for their skill set. They are imper-
fect indicators of the more specific skill mismatch, whereby workers’ actual skills are mea-
sured against the specific skill requirements of the job (Levels et al. 2014). Despite research
development to advance the measurement of skill mismatch (e.g. Pellizzari and Fichen
2013; OECD 2016) an internationally comparable and sufficiently broad assessment of skill
mismatch remains an area for future work (CEDRA 2009). Research attention to qualifica-
tions and field-of-study mismatch remains relevant, as workers’ specific skills are high to
identify in the process of selection and recruitment. Qualifications and field-of-study re-
main relevant indicators of worker skills given the fact that sorting hinges on these two sig-
nals. For specific applications of field-of-study in the context of skill mismatch, see, for
example, McGuinness and Sloane (2011), Garcia-Aracil and van der Velden (2008) and van
de Werfhorst (2002); for discussions on qualification mismatch and its relationship to
skills, see, for example, Levels et al. 2014, Quintini 2011b and Chevalier 2003.
Hartog (2000) uses human capital, job competition and assignment theories to frame
overqualification and the relationship to wages. This framework can be applied to field-
of-study mismatch. From a human capital theory perspective, firms will adapt their
production process to changes in the relative supply of labour. Any mismatch, includ-
ing field-of-study mismatch, is temporary and firms will adjust their demand and pro-
ductive process to the available stock of human capital. Job competition theories argue,
in contrast, that workers line up in the hiring queue—according to their educational
credentials and field-of-study, or other criteria relevant to employers for the purposes
of sorting jobseekers for the available vacancies—but it is the characteristics of the job
that determines the productivity of the job, not the human capital stock of the em-
ployee. In the job competition model, field-of-study mismatch is a result of employers
in a particular occupational group requiring more workers than available in the corre-
sponding field, thus having to draw workers from further down the queue, reaching
those that come from different fields. In job competition theory, field-of-study mis-
match can also result from employers downplaying field-of-study as a relevant signal in
the hiring process. Importantly, as workers’ productivity depends on the characteristics
of the job, in job competition theory, there should be no wage penalty associated with
field-of-study mismatch (or any other type of mismatch thereof ).
The empirical evidence supports a third, intermediate model: assignment theory. In
it, the productivity of a job and the allocation process depend on both demand and
supply factors (Sattinger 1993). They specify that workers’ income or utility maximisa-
tion guides workers to choose particular jobs over others, but, in equal importance,
jobs or groups of occupations available to workers and the mechanism that assigns
workers to jobs need to be considered. Thus, for a particular job, certain workers will
have more advantages (as a result of their general and job/field-specific skills acquired
in formal training) than others, but these jobs may or may not be available to them,
possibly pushing them to choose other jobs or fields instead. Assignment theories pre-
dict that productivity (and wages) will depend on the quality of the match between the
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job and the worker and that the likelihood of a field-of-study match will depend on
both the skill demand in a particular occupational group and the supply of workers
from the corresponding field.
Assignment theories thus effectively predict that mismatched workers by field-of-
study will suffer a wage penalty by virtue of their lower productivity (i.e. their lack
field-specific skills) or higher costs (i.e. need to acquire field-specific skills) than their
well-matched peers and that, as workers acquire experience in the field of their jobs
(and field-specific skills), the quality of the match between their skills and their job re-
quirements will improve and so will their wages relative to their well-matched peers
(Nordin et al. 2010; OECD 2014). A mismatched worker will not be able to use his/her
field-specific skills on the job, and their employers will not reward these skills. Field-of-
study mismatched workers are thus expected (and do in general) earn lower salaries
when compared to their well-matched peers (Wolbers 2003; Robst 2007a; McGuinness
and Sloane 2011), even after accounting for skill heterogeneity (Nordin et al. 2010) or
qualification mismatch (Robst 2008). Field-of-study mismatched workers who are also
overqualified are expected to suffer an even larger penalty.
Further, assignment theories suggest that the process of allocation of workers to jobs
needs to consider both the supply and the demand of workers to understand field-of-
study mismatch. This has motivated researchers to verify how firm characteristics relate
to mismatch. Wolbers (2003) finds, for example, that field-of-study mismatch is more
common among workers in small firms, those in the private sector and among those
under part-time or temporary contracts. Robst (2007a, 2007b) acknowledges, but does
not test, that accepting a job on another field-of-study depends on both supply and de-
mand factors. Supply factors include the transferability of skills acquired in formal
training in the particular field (with those degrees that have a higher emphasis on the
provision of general skills—as opposed to job/field/occupation-specific skills—being
more likely to promote out-field employment). Pay and promotion, career interests,
working conditions, job location, family-related reasons and other preferences a worker
has for different job characteristics are other supply-side factors predicting field-of-
study mismatch. As such, workers with more cognitive or soft skills compared to
workers in his or her field may choose a job in another field if occupations in the other
field offer higher pay or better working conditions; workers with fewer skills may be
crowded out in their field. Demand factors driving field-of-study mismatch refer to the
fact that a job in the related occupational group may just not available.
Previous studies, however, have not included these supply and demand attributes in
the analysis of field-of-study mismatch (a noteworthy exception, in the context of over-
education, is McGuinness and Pouliakas 2016). 1 The general/specific orientation of the
formal training received has been evaluated qualitatively and rather subjectively by
mentioning that training in fields like the humanities are more general-oriented than
those in health and welfare while observing that, coincidentally, field-of-study mis-
match is higher among the former than the latter (Robst 2007a) or by respondent self-
reports of the nature of the training received (Verhaest et al. 2013). But demand factors
may explain the occurrence of this mismatch as well, as the availability of jobs in the
humanities may be lower, relative to the number of graduates, than those in the health
and welfare professions. The relationship between demand and mismatch has yet to be
empirically tested. The joint occurrence of the transferability of skills in a given field
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and the demand for workers in that field has not been tested empirically, as most
field-of-mismatch studies typically ignore the broader labour market context in which
field-of-study mismatch takes place. A first exception is Wolbers (2003), who finds
that mismatch is more common among workers who enter the labour market in a
context of economic recession, pointing to broad demand factors, but does not ana-
lyse field-specific demand. The theoretical likelihood of the relationship between the
labour market context and the likelihood of field-of-study mismatch is even clearer
by acknowledging that employers rank field-specific knowledge as the most important
attribute in determining a prospective workers’ employability (Humburg et al. 2013),
so the lack of employers in a particular field (irrespective of graduates’ individual
characteristics) will hinder graduates’ employability because their field of specialisa-
tion is not aligned with the market demand for that field. A second exception to the
consideration of labour market conditions in predicting mismatch is Verhaest et al.
(2013) and Verhaest and van der Velden (2013) who find that business cycles explain
the likelihood of overeducation that skill transferability explain the likelihood of both
qualification and field-of-study mismatch. They also find a relationship between the
labour market context (employment protection legislation, level of unemployment
benefits and union bargaining power) and the likelihood of mismatch.
In attempting to find explanations for the occurrence of field-of-study mismatch, this
paper proposes measures of field saturation and field transferability of skills—as proxies
of skill demand and supply, respectively. It measures the levels of field-of-study mis-
match across more than 20 countries and quantifies the wage penalties for workers in
the presence or absence of qualification mismatch.
Previous studies have explored the individual-level correlates of mismatch by field-of-
study. These findings show that mismatched workers are more likely to receive lower
wages (Wolbers 2003; Robst 2007a; Kelly et al. 2010; Nordin et al. 2010; Quintini
2011b; OECD 2014), experience lower levels of job satisfaction and are more likely to
be actively looking for a job while in the job (Wolbers 2003; Béduwé and Giret 2011).
These findings are consistent with assignment theory (Sattinger 1993) as the wage pen-
alty is stronger for individuals who report that their field-of-study is at a greater dis-
tance from the occupational group (Robst 2008; Nordin et al. 2010). Also, the wage
penalty decreases with tenure in the job, in line with the assumption that mismatched
workers earn job-specific skills in the workplace (Nordin et al. 2010).
Few of the studies that explore the individual-level correlates of field-of-study mismatch
allow for comparable estimates across countries as they rely on self-reported mismatch
mismatch (e.g. Robst 2007a, 2007b, 2008; Kelly et al. 2010; Nordin et al. 2010; Verhaest et
al. 2013) or rely on relatively old data (e.g. Wolbers 2003; Quintini 2011b). Even fewer
studies explore the correlates of field-of-study mismatch in conjunction with qualification
mismatch (see, for example, Kelly et al. 2010, Béduwé and Giret 2011 and Kim et al. 2012
for noteworthy exceptions). The importance of accounting for qualification mismatch in
analyses of the relationship between field-of-study mismatch and pay (or any other indi-
vidual correlate thereof) is both statistical and conceptual.
Most graduates will hope to gain employment at the level of their qualifications and
in the field of specialisation (i.e. well-matched) and avoid employment that is both in
another field and at a lower qualification level. However, the decision process that leads
an individual to be matched by field but overqualified or well-matched by qualification
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level but mismatched by field-of-study is unclear. For some recent graduates, particu-
larly in fields that experience high levels of saturation and/or low levels of transferabil-
ity, the priority might be to find work in the field, even if that means accepting a job
with lower qualifications; for others, from fields with high transferability, the priority
might be to find work at the appropriate qualification level, even if that means accept-
ing a job in a different field. Moreover, studies that fail to account for qualification mis-
match while estimating the field-of-study mismatch wage penalty risk producing biased
estimates as part of the marginal penalty associated with field-of-study mismatch have
to do with workers having to downgrade in order to find work in other fields rather
than to them working in other fields per se (Kim et al. 2012).
This paper attempts to bridge these gaps in the literature by examining how satur-
ation and transferability influence both overqualification and field-of-study mismatch
and estimates the respective wage penalties. The following sections describe the data
and methods used, including the measures proposed to estimate field saturation and
transferability, the results and the main conclusions.
3 Data
Data for this study comes from the Programme for International Assessment of Adult
Competencies’ Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC). PIAAC is a cross-national survey—24
countries took part in 20122—that measures adults’ numeracy, literacy and problem-
solving in a technology-rich environment. In addition to the assessment, PIAAC asks
respondents about their job characteristics, their education and training, their use of
different skills at work and home and their socio-demographic characteristics. Given
the diversity of participating countries, both the assessment and the background ques-
tionnaire were developed and piloted to ensure linguistic and cultural comparability.
The PIAAC target population were all non-institutionalised adults aged 16 to 65 (inclu-
sive) who reside in the country at the time of the assessment, regardless of their nation-
ality, citizenship or language. On average across participating countries, a probability-
based sample of more than 5000 adults was drawn, following population registries or
household registries where population registries were unavailable. Depending on the
characteristics of each country and its sampling frame, different multistage sampling
designs were used; the samples for all countries are representative of the target popula-
tion (OECD 2013a). Given that mismatch compares the characteristics of the job with
individuals’ characteristics, the analytical sample (N = 63,772) for the study draws on in-
dividuals who have graduated from an upper-secondary or higher level (ISCED 3 or
higher) with a field-specific programme and who are employed in an occupation that can
be related to a specific field-of-study.3 Results in this study apply to the population of indi-
viduals who graduate from field-specific education programmes and are employed.
Given that PIAAC is a probability sample with different sampling strategies by coun-
try, weights are used to make the overall sample representative to the population of
workers aged 15 to 64 who are employed in fields other than “general programmes.”4
For country-specific analyses, the estimates are weighted by the full final weight pro-
vided in the survey. For pooled analyses, final weights provided in the survey are ad-
justed so that each country contributes an equal weighted sum of observations,
equivalent to the average sample size observed across countries, to prevent countries
with larger weighted samples leveraging the results (the USA has an overall weighted
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sum of observations equal to the target population of 203 million, while Estonia is less
than one million).
PIAAC uses a complex sampling strategy. As a result, standard errors estimated
under the assumption of simple random sampling (as is the case in most standard stat-
istical packages) will be biased. PIAAC provides jackknife-based replicate weights to
correctly account for the complex sampling design (OECD 2013a). The estimates pre-
sented in this paper take these weights into account through the use of the publicly
available “PIAAC Tool” macro.5
4 Methods
This paper measures field-of-study mismatch, the relationship to overqualification, the
relationship to field saturation and transferability and the related wage penalties. The
following sections describe these measures and the models to assess their relationships.
4.1 Field-of-study mismatch and overqualification
This paper follows Wolbers’ (2003) and Quintini’s (2011b) approach to the measure-
ment of field-of-study mismatch in a cross-national context, whereby each education
degree is categorised in one of nine fields and each ISCO-08 three-digit occupation is
matched to one or more fields. In PIAAC, respondents were asked “What was the area
of study, emphasis or major for your highest level of qualification? If there was more
than one, please choose the one you consider most important”6 with respondents asked
to select one of the nine field categories: (i) general programmes; (ii) teacher training
and education science; (iii) humanities, languages and arts; (iv) social sciences, business
and law; (v) science, mathematics and computing; (vi) engineering, manufacturing and
construction; (vii) agriculture and veterinary; (viii) health and welfare and (ix) services.7
The question is open to all individuals, irrespective of their level of attainment. De-
pending on the country, individuals with at most an upper-secondary education degree
may report field-specific programmes (e.g. graduates from vocational programmes).
Respondents are also asked an open question about their job title and their responsi-
bilities in the job (both for their current job or the one they last held, if they are cur-
rently unemployed or out of the labour force). These descriptions are used to derive
each respondent’s ISCO-08 three-digit occupation. Using Quintini’s (2011b) coding
strategy, updated for ISCO-08 codes, each occupation is assigned to one of the nine
fields of study (see Appendix 1 for details on the calculation of field-of-study mis-
match). Whenever a worker reports having studied in a field that is different than the
field(s) that correspond to his/her occupation, the worker is considered to be mis-
matched by field-of-study. The coding that assigns each occupational code to the corre-
sponding field or fields of study is available in Appendix 1. Under this coding scheme,
certain occupations may be matched to more than one field, as a particular occupation
may be a relevant destination for graduates from different fields (e.g. an author, journal-
ist or linguist (ISCO-08 code 264) is considered to be matched to his/her field of study
if they graduated from the “Humanities, languages and arts” or “Social sciences, busi-
ness and law” fields). Qualification mismatch is estimated for each individual compar-
ing his or her own educational attainment with their report on the adequate
educational level needed to get their job at the time of the survey. Overqualified
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workers are those that have a higher educational attainment than that reported to get
their job (Quintini 2011a, 2011b; OECD 2013b).
4.2 Field saturation
A field is saturated in the labour market when there are more graduates in the corre-
sponding occupational group relative to the jobs available in the occupational group; if
there are few jobs available in an occupational group, workers are forced to search else-
where for a job. Field saturation is estimated, by the ratio of the number of graduates
from a particular field to the number of workers in the corresponding occupational
group. Formally, the saturation S of field f in country c can be expressed as
Sf ;c ¼ Gf ;cW f ;c ð1Þ
where Gf,c is the number of graduates from field f in country c and Wf,c is the number
of workers currently employed in occupations in occupational group f in country c. Gf,c
is estimated directly from respondents’ report to the field-of-study that corresponds to
their highest degree and includes individuals both employed and not employed. Wf,c is
derived from the number of workers in the corresponding occupational group.
As discussed in the measurement of field-of-study mismatch, while the Gf,c is based
on one-response per respondent, Wf,c is based on the attribution that allows for one oc-
cupation to belong to more than one field. Given this specification, the indicator has
no interpretable scale. It is thus centred at 0 for countries and fields, so that positive
(negative) values indicate that, for the specific field, there is higher (lower) saturation
than the average field across participating countries. It is standardised to have a stand-
ard deviation of 1 across fields and countries, so that a value of 1 (−1) indicates that
the saturation is one standard deviation above (below) the average observed across all
fields and countries.8
This indicator provides insight on the saturation of a particular field, but is not
perfect, particularly because it does not clearly identify the source of the saturation.
Ideally, field saturation and shortage would be measured using trends in vacancies
or using wage pressure analyses. This information is, however, unavailable in the
Survey of Adult Skills or unavailable, using other data sources for all the countries
and fields used in this paper. The measure of field saturation also assumes that
saturation is constant for all workers within the field. There may be segmentation
within the field, however, with saturation present in the occupations that require
certain educational attainment, but not for occupations in the occupational group
requiring another educational attainment. In the case of “Agriculture and veterin-
ary,” for example, the field may be saturated at the professional level, forcing many
graduates with university degrees in the field to work in other occupational groups,
but the occupational group may face shortages or have low barriers to entry at the
lower occupational levels, attracting graduates from other fields with upper-
secondary school qualifications specific to other occupational groups.
Appendix 2: Table 3 provides the field saturation indices for each field in each
country.
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4.3 Field transferability
A field provides transferable skills when workers can work in different fields without
having to downgrade. It is determined by the generality/specificity of the skills provided
in the field’s formal training and the degree to which employers value or recognise skills
from other fields (Ormiston 2014). Some research has explored transferability between
occupations. These measures can be occupation-based (Shaw 1987) or skill-based
(Ormiston 2014), yielding different results but each explaining part of wage gaps associ-
ated with occupation changes (Nawakitphaitoon and Ormiston 2016). Though this ap-
proach can be extended to fields of study, they impose a unique relationship between
occupations across different national contexts. For a comparative study, this is a serious
limitation as the labour market and skill development characteristics differ across bor-
ders. For example, as a result of the specific curriculum and/or employer’s awareness of
the value of skills from different fields, workers in Anglo-Saxon countries may be better
able to change occupations than workers in other countries, even if they hold a degree
from the same field.
This paper draws on the patterns of mobility in each country to estimate the
country-specific transferability of each field of study. Field transferability is estimated
by the proportion of workers working in another occupational group that are not mis-
matched in terms of skills or qualifications. Formally, the transferability T of field f in
country c can be expressed as
Tf ;c ¼ Tf ;cMf ;c ð2Þ
where Tf,c is the number of graduates from field f in country c that are working in another
field but are well matched by literacy skills and qualifications and Mf,c is the number of
graduates from field f in country c that are working in another field. Literacy skill match is
defined following Pellizzari and Fichen (2013). The high correlation between respondents’
scores in literacy, numeracy and problem-solving (OECD 2016) renders literacy skill mis-
match a good proxy for workers’ information-processing skill mismatch. This skill trans-
ferability indicator ranges from 0 to 1, with values closer to 1 indicating a higher degree of
transferability as more workers are able to work in other occupations without downgrad-
ing with respect to their qualifications or information-processing skills. This approach to
estimating the skill transferability associated with each field of study accounts for differ-
ences in the labour market and skill development characteristics of different countries.
Models predict the likelihood of mismatch given their field’s skill transferability-risk endo-
geneity. This is particularly the case in country-specific models, but less so in pooled
models due to the variability in institutional settings across countries.
This measure of skill transferability is not independent from employers’ behaviour.
The ability of a worker to be mismatched by field but accurately matched by qualifica-
tion and literacy skills depends on the transferability of the skills themselves and em-
ployers’ capacity to identify and/or value transferable skills.9
Appendix 2: Table 4 provides the field transferability indices for each field in each country.
4.4 Model specification
This paper uses simultaneous regressions (i.e. path analysis in SAS’s PROC CALIS) to
estimate the relationship between field saturation, field transferability, field-of-study
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mismatch, overqualification and wages. Estimates presented are unstandardized and
should be interpreted considering the scale of the variables, just like any regression-
based analyses. To use the complete variability of the PIAAC dataset when accounting
for field characteristics, path analyses are run on pooled data. Formally, these models
estimate, jointly, the following relationships:
lnðwageiÞ ¼ β0 þ β1Si þ β2Ti þ β3Fi þ β4Qi þ β5FQi þ β6Ni þ X
0
γ þ Z0μþ ε1i
Fi ¼ α0 þ α1Si þ α2Ti þ α3Ni þ ε2i
Qi ¼ δ0 þ δ1Si þ δ2Ni þ ε3i
FQi ¼ ω0 þ ω1Si þ ω2Ti þ ω3Fi þ ω4Ni þ ε4i
ð3Þ
where wagei is the respondents’ hourly wages including bonuses in PPP-corrected
2012 USD; Si and Ti are the field- and country-specific saturation and transferability
measures, respectively, described above; Fi, Qi and FQi are dummy variables indicat-
ing whether the respondent is mismatched by field-of-study only, is overqualified only
or is mismatched by both field-of-study and overqualified, respectively; Ni is the respon-
dent’s numeracy skill score and X is a vector of individual and firm-level controls
including age, age-squared, experience, experience-squared, tenure, firm size and
dummy variables indicating whether the worker is under a temporary work ar-
rangement, working full time, working in a public organisation or NGO as well as
fixed effects for each field of study (Z). Figure 1 below shows these relationships
schematically with the resulting estimates.
The relationship between labour market dynamics, mismatch and wages
Fig. 1 Notes: Estimates from path analysis (i.e. simultaneous equations). Coefficients shown are unstandardized
estimates and can be interpreted as the association between a one-unit change in the independent variable
on the corresponding change in the dependent variable, as signalled by the direction of the arrow. Statistically
significant estimates (at the p < 0.05 level) are shown in a continuous line. Firm and individual-level controls
(variables C1–C6) include age, age-squared, experience, experience-squared, tenure and dummy variables for
temporary contract, public sector or NGO, firm size and field-of-study (major). Numeracy scores are rescaled so
that one unit equals 100 points. Source: Own calculations from the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) (2012)
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This paper also estimates the following standard wage regressions for each of the par-
ticipating countries to assess the country-specific mismatch wage penalties. These wage
regressions are estimated separately for each country and do not include the transfer-
ability (Ti) or saturation (Si) measures but add, instead, field-specific fixed effects to
avoid endogeneity with the mismatch measures:
lnðwageÞi ¼ β0 þ β1Fi þ β2Qi þ β3FQi þ β4Ni þ X
0
γ þ Z0μþ ε1i ð4Þ
All wage regressions exclude observations with wages above the 99th and below
the 1st percentile in each country. Missing values on analytical variables have
been imputed to the country-specific mean using the dummy-variable imputation
method to avoid losing further observations (Allison 2002). It is important to note
that the causal implications of these models are limited given the cross-sectional
nature of the PIAAC data and the possibility of omitted variable bias. Though
models control for numeracy, the issue of skill heterogeneity (Quintini 2011a;
Chevalier 2003) may still bias results inasmuch other wage-relevant skill differ-
ences between workers with the same qualifications and the same field remain un-
accounted. These include, notably, soft and/or social skills (Duncan and Dunifon 2012).
5 Results
Table 1 shows the incidence of field-of-study mismatch and overqualification across 23
countries. On average across these countries, 25% of dependent workers are mismatched
by field but working at an adequate qualification level (mismatched horizontally, but not
vertically); 11% are overqualified in their field and 13% are overqualified and working in
another field. Field-of-study mismatch (with or without overqualification) is most likely in
Korea (50%), England/N. Ireland (UK) (50%), Italy (49%) and the USA (45%). It is lowest
in Austria, Finland and Germany, at less than 30%. Field-of-study mismatch is most likely
to exist with overqualification in Ireland, Spain, Canada, Japan and France where over
40% of workers who are field-of-study mismatched are also overqualified. In Poland, Flan-
ders (Belgium) and the Slovak Republic, less than a quarter of field-of-study mismatched
workers are also overqualified.
Figure 1 shows the results from the simultaneous regression models. It shows that, as
expected, labour market conditions in the form of field saturation and field transferability
are associated to the likelihood and type of mismatch. Graduates from fields that offer
greater transferability are more likely to be mismatched by field only and less likely to be
mismatched and overqualified: these workers seem better able to make horizontal moves
without having to downgrade. Graduates from fields that are more saturated are more
likely to be working in other fields, both at their qualification level and below their qualifi-
cation levels; they are also less likely to be overqualified in their own field. That is, gradu-
ates from saturated fields are more likely to work in other fields and, often, have to
downgrade in order to do so.
Field-of-study mismatched workers face an important wage penalty when field-of-
study mismatch is accompanied by overqualification; it amounts to 25% lower
earnings compared to their well-matched peers.10 For field-mismatched workers
that do not downgrade, the penalty is only 3%. These estimates are in line with
those observed in the literature (e.g. Robst 2008; Nordin et al. 2010), particularly
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with those that distinguish between field-mismatch and overqualification (Kim et
al. 2012). By including workers’ numeracy level, these models control for skill het-
erogeneity (Chevalier 2003; Quintini 2011a).
The estimates in Fig. 1 depict the average worker in the average participating
country. As suggested by the relationship to labour market and skill development
characteristics, there is cross-national variability in the size of the field-of-study
mismatch wage penalty, as shown in Table 2. In fact, the field-of-study mismatch
wage penalty among workers who do not downgrade is statistically significant only
in Estonia, Ireland and Italy; in the majority of countries, there is no wage penalty
for mismatched worker by field who are well qualified in their jobs (the estimate is
Table 1 Incidence of field-of-study mismatch and overqualification







Austria 18.1 (0.85) 14.2 (0.76) 9.7 (0.72) 2523
Canada 21.3 (0.56) 13.2 (0.48) 15.8 (0.59) 10,615
Cyprusa, b 28.7 (1.23) 8.7 (0.78) 9.7 (0.75) 1508
Czech Republic 27.6 (1.26) 11.1 (0.97) 10.3 (0.85) 2612
Denmark 24.5 (0.73) 8.5 (0.54) 10.6 (0.61) 3666
England/N. Ireland (UK) 30.1 (0.88) 11.8 (0.72) 19.5 (1.03) 3714
Estonia 22.2 (0.70) 16.7 (0.66) 12.9 (0.58) 3217
Finland 16.1 (0.66) 10.9 (0.65) 6.5 (0.55) 2706
Flanders (Belgium) 29.4 (1.04) 7.9 (0.59) 9.1 (0.57) 2177
France 24.2 (0.65) 19.5 (0.68) 16.6 (0.63) 2785
Germany 15.7 (0.68) 14.6 (0.81) 9.6 (0.59) 2817
Ireland 22.0 (1.02) 13.2 (0.91) 19.1 (1.15) 1833
Italy 34.1 (1.34) 6.8 (0.89) 15.3 (1.06) 1450
Japan 26.2 (1.09) 16.9 (0.78) 18.6 (0.87) 2058
Korea 34.9 (1.13) 7.5 (0.61) 15.1 (0.86) 1967
Netherlands 24.3 (0.89) 8.8 (0.65) 9.5 (0.56) 2272
Norway 22.1 (0.90) 9.5 (0.59) 11.3 (0.60) 2687
Poland 30.6 (1.11) 7.9 (0.67) 9.7 (0.70) 3393
Russian Federationc 27.7 (1.50) 14.5 (0.86) 14.0 (1.77) 1599
Slovak Republic 29.4 (1.05) 10.5 (0.77) 8.6 (0.62) 2408
Spain 23.6 (1.17) 10.2 (0.84) 19.5 (1.13) 1539
Sweden 21.8 (0.80) 8.6 (0.53) 10.8 (0.67) 2421
USA 29.6 (1.14) 10.9 (0.90) 15.4 (0.88) 1805
Country average 25.4 (0.21) 11.4 (0.15) 12.9 (0.18) 2773
Incidence is calculated over dependent workers. Source: Own calculations from the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) (2012)
aFootnote by Turkey: The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the
Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of
United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”
bFootnote by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Union: The Republic of Cyprus is
recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates
to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus
cThe data from the Russian Federation are preliminary and may be subject to change. Readers should note that the
sample for the Russian Federation does not include the population of the Moscow municipal area. The data published,
therefore, do not represent the entire resident population aged 16–65 in Russia but rather the population of Russia
excluding the population residing in the Moscow municipal area. More detailed information regarding the data from the
Russian Federation as well as that of other countries can be found in the Technical Report of the Survey of Adult Skills
(OECD 2013a)
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non-significant in 18 countries). In Estonia, Ireland and Italy, the field-of-study
mismatch wage penalty without overqualification is around 9%. In Ireland and
Italy, there is a penalty for field-of-study mismatch that does not bring about over-
qualification, but there is no additional field-of-study penalty when workers are
already overqualified. One way to interpret this is that overqualification overrides
field-of-study mismatch and field-of-study has little value once workers are over-
qualified. In Finland and Sweden, mismatched workers by field-of-study who are
well matched in terms of occupations tend to earn more than their well-matched
field-of-study peers, probably because the most productive mismatched workers by field
are attracted by the better salaries in other fields instead of staying in the field they studied
or because employers value graduates from different fields equally, so mismatched
workers are not penalised by their lack of job-specific skills.
In Austria, Canada, Estonia, Flanders (Belgium), Germany and the Netherlands, the
field-of-study mismatch penalty exists only among the overqualified. This is the add-
itional penalty that overqualified workers receive because of field-of-study mismatch;
Table 2 The wage penalty of field-of-study mismatch and overqualification






Austria 0.00 (0.02) −0.14*** (0.02) −0.22*** (0.03)
Canada −0.02 (0.02) −0.24*** (0.02) −0.33*** (0.02)
Cyprusa, b −0.06 (0.03) −0.24*** (0.05) −0.37*** (0.05)
Czech Republic 0.00 (0.03) −0.19*** (0.04) −0.22*** (0.04)
Denmark 0.02 (0.01) −0.18*** (0.02) −0.21*** (0.02)
England/N. Ireland (UK) −0.01 (0.02) −0.24*** (0.03) −0.26*** (0.03)
Estonia −0.08** (0.03) −0.24*** (0.03) −0.43*** (0.03)
Finland 0.04* (0.02) −0.14*** (0.02) −0.19*** (0.03)
Flanders (Belgium) −0.01 (0.02) −0.09*** (0.03) −0.17*** (0.02)
France 0.03 (0.01) −0.16*** (0.02) −0.16*** (0.02)
Germany 0.00 (0.02) −0.17*** (0.03) −0.33*** (0.04)
Ireland −0.10*** (0.03) −0.27*** (0.03) −0.34*** (0.03)
Italy −0.09** (0.03) −0.13** (0.05) −0.17*** (0.04)
Japan 0.04 (0.03) −0.21*** (0.03) −0.24*** (0.03)
Korea −0.03 (0.03) −0.22*** (0.06) −0.30*** (0.05)
Netherlands 0.00 (0.02) −0.18*** (0.02) −0.30*** (0.04)
Norway 0.01 (0.02) −0.16*** (0.02) −0.18*** (0.02)
Poland 0.00 (0.03) −0.25*** (0.04) −0.31*** (0.04)
Russian Federationc −0.04 (0.04) −0.08 (0.04) 0.00 (0.05)
Slovak Republic −0.03 (0.03) −0.20*** (0.04) −0.20*** (0.05)
Spain 0.01 (0.03) −0.22*** (0.04) −0.26*** (0.03)
Sweden 0.05** (0.01) −0.11*** (0.02) −0.16*** (0.02)
USA 0.01 (0.03) −0.25*** (0.04) −0.30*** (0.04)
Country average −0.01* (0.01) −0.19*** (0.01) −0.25*** (0.01)
Estimates from regression models on log(wages). Reference category is well-matched workers who are not overqualified.
Models control for age, age2, experience, experience2, tenure, type of contract (temporary/regular, full/part-time), public/
NGO/private sector of the firm, firm size, numeracy skills and field-of-study. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. *** p < 0.001. Source:
Own calculations from the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) (2012)
a, b, c See notes to Table 1
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it is not the sum of a field-of-study penalty and the overqualification penalty. In
Germany and the Netherlands, although field-mismatched workers do not face a pen-
alty when they are matched by qualifications, workers mismatched by field face a pen-
alty of over 12% if they are overqualified, which comes in addition to the penalty that
they expect by virtue of being overqualified to begin with (around 17%). In Estonia,
mismatched workers are sure to face a penalty, whether they are overqualified for the
job or not; it amounts to 8 and 19% for workers who are matched by qualifications
and overqualified, respectively.
6 Conclusions
All countries experience some level of field-of-study mismatch, with the highest levels
observed in Korea, England/N. Ireland (UK) and Italy—at around 50% of workers—and
the lowest in Austria, Germany and Finland—at less than 30%. Some level of mismatch
is expected as individuals look for a job that fits their skills and interests and as econ-
omies shift in the types and levels of skill in demand in the labour market. Mismatch is
also expected as workers age and career decisions depend more on their past experi-
ence than on their formal education. Using data from PIAAC, it is difficult to estimate
what proportion of this mismatch is temporary or to what extent mismatch is a transi-
tory stage in workers’ careers. Future studies should explore the magnitude and transi-
ence of field-of-study mismatch, as well as the long-term consequences for individual
workers who enter their careers in a mismatched job, especially if that mismatched job
entailed overqualification. Importantly, however, results from this study suggest that
field-of-study mismatch need not be considered negative per se, as workers who find a
job at their correct qualification level but in another field do not experience a statisti-
cally significant wage penalty in most countries.
Field-of-study mismatch is responsive to the broader labour market context; it is
not an individual outcome or one that results uniquely from workers’ choice. Field
saturation is predictive of a higher likelihood of individual field-of-study mismatch.
The demand for skills in the labour market is one of the drivers of mismatch:
when there are more graduates from a particular field than jobs available in that
field, some necessarily need to look elsewhere for a job. Some of these workers
may find work in another field for which they are overqualified; others will be ad-
equately matched by their qualifications. The costs of mismatch can be reduced if
graduates from saturated fields need not downgrade to jobs with lower qualifica-
tion requirements or if skill anticipation systems are in place to reduce the likeli-
hood that any given field is highly saturated in the future. Training programmes
that recognise skills developed in another field can allow workers from saturated
fields to apply their skills to other fields without having to undergo complete train-
ing programmes again.
The supply of skills, through the characteristics of the training received, and the
labour market’s ability to recognise skills from different fields can also drive field-
of-study mismatch. Fields-of-study that provide more transferrable skills offer their
graduates more opportunities to find work in other fields and increase the likeli-
hood that in the event of field-of-study mismatch, workers can find jobs at the ad-
equate qualification level, thus reducing the costs associated with field-of-study
mismatch. However, the transferability of skills is not equally predictive of field-of-
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study mismatch across all countries, pointing to the articulation of education sys-
tems and curricula and the extent to which a particular field provides the same set
of general skills across all countries and how credentials are used as signals of
worker skills. Such variability is also consistent with the relationship between each
field’s skill transferability levels and the field-of-study mismatch penalty. This sig-
nals that the relationship between skill transferability and wages varies greatly by
country, possibly because of the degree to which employers rely on field-of-study
as a measure of worker skills or because of the degree of transferability of skills of
each field across countries (training for a particular field may be more field-
specific in one country than another, and/or employers may be more willing and
able to recognise skills obtained in another field).
The fact that in most countries, there is no significant wage penalty associated
with field-of-study mismatch when workers are not overqualified (Table 2) and that
overqualification accounts for only a part of the total field-of-study mismatch
(Table 1) suggests that training is already producing sufficient skills to allow at
least some, but not all, workers to move across fields at the same qualification
level. Investing in retraining or providing alternative career paths so that mis-
matched workers can earn a credential in a new field at their same qualification
level may help the labour market prospects of mismatched workers who are forced
to downgrade and also reduce the risks associated to field-of-study mismatch
which appear when workers have to downgrade. Encouraging the development of
more general skills in training so that workers who are not able to find work in
their field-of-study do not have to downgrade to find work may be advisable as is
the determination of vacancies in educational programmes in accordance to the
current or expected labour market demand. Moreover, encouraging the develop-
ment of a qualification framework that takes into account workers’ flexibility may
help employers recognise workers’ skills and thus recognise that, for many occupa-
tions, a perfect match between field-of-study and occupation is not a requirement
for sufficient performance in the job which in turn will allow for graduates from
saturated fields to find jobs at their qualification levels in other fields.
Consistent with previous studies, in PIAAC, mismatched individuals experience a
wage penalty. It is largely driven by overqualification. Field-of-study mismatch implies,
at most and in only a handful of countries, a small penalty for workers, but it is large if
workers are forced to take a job that is below their qualification level. Overqualification
in or outside the field points to lost productivity related to a lack of job-specific skills
(models control for skill heterogeneity) and can aggregate to important national level
costs (Mavromaras et al. 2009).
Field-of-study mismatch, though not as problematic when it does not entail over-
qualification, should be addressed at the policy level because of the consequences
it brings to individuals who downgrade and become overqualified. Considering that
the bulk of the wage penalty that results from field-of-study mismatch comes from
workers’ downgrading, facilitating the transferability of workers and skills across
fields without having to downgrade (by recognising their skills through comprehen-
sive qualification frameworks or by offering workers and graduates the opportunity
to re-skill in a different field while recognising their highest qualification) may help
reduce the costs of field-of-study mismatch.
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Endnotes
1McGuinness and Pouliakas (2016) assess human capital attributes (supply), job char-
acteristics and job skill needs (demand) in addition to information assymetries and
compensating wage differentials to estimate the overeducation wage penalty. They find
support for differences in human capital, job skill requirements, job characteristics and
job skill content as explanatory factors behind the wage penalty. They find less support
in favour of compensating wage differentials.
2For simplicity, throughout this paper, all national entities that took part in PIAAC
are referred to as “countries” even though some may not be considered as such under
certain definitions (e.g. the Flemish Community of Belgium). Nine additional countries
implemented the survey in 2014 but are not included in the analysis to ensure max-
imum comparability.
3Australia is excluded from the analytical sample due to the unavailability of oc-
cupation data at the ISCO-08 three-digit level, necessary for the identification of
field-of-study mismatch. Following the analytical strategy of Quintini (2011b), of
the original 2012 sample that does not include Australia (N = 158,169), the analyt-
ical sample includes individuals who graduated from a specific educational
programme (excluding those with no formal qualification or below ISCED 2;
remaining N = 98 517), who are employed (remaining N = 75 764), who are in the
armed forces occupational category (ISCO-08 code 0) or other unclassifiable occu-
pations (chief executives, senior officials and legislators; social and religious profes-
sionals; street and market salespersons and manufacturing labourers) or those
requiring very minimal training that is not field-specific (subsistence farmers/hunters/fish-
ermen; food preparation assistants; street and related sales and service workers; refuse
workers and other elementary workers) (remaining N = 72,285). The analytical sample
also excludes individuals with missing information in other analytical variables used as
controls in the models (remaining N = 63 772).
4For the representativity of the analytical sample to this target population, several as-
sumptions must hold among which (a) missing data on any of the analytical variables
must be completely at random and (b) the distribution of weights in the sample is in-
variant to this change in the target population (i.e. the sampling strata are not affected
by this change in the definition of the population).
5The macro and user documentation is available for SAS and Stata at http://
www.oecd.org/skills/piaac/publicdataandanalysis/.
6PIAAC asks about the highest qualification. For individuals with more than one
qualification, it is not possible to assess which is the latest one or the one that is most
closely related to their job. Certain individuals may have obtained a qualification and
went back to education to earn a second, lowest one which more closely matches their
career interests. Although impossible to quantify in PIAAC, these cases would be
marked as mismatched by field of study when, in practice, they may not experience
such mismatch.
7Services include fields related to the provision of personal services, transport ser-
vices, environmental protection and security services.
8Models that assume a one-to-one match between occupations and fields in the esti-
mation of saturation yield similar results to those presented in this report (available
upon demand). Assuming one-to-one match between occupations adds many
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unverifiable assumptions to the models, reason for which the one-to-many approach
was preferred.
9It may be the case that for some field-of-study mismatched workers, transferability
is high because they have taken further training not captured by their highest educa-
tional qualification. Since skill transferability is a measure to characterise fields of study,
this situation will bias the skill transferability measure if workers from a particular field
are more likely to undergo unobserved training than workers that graduated from an-
other field.
10For a mismatched worker, a well-matched peers is one that graduated from the
same field and the same level but working in the appropriate field and the appropriate
qualification level.
Appendix 1
6.1 Linking ISCO-08 occupations to the appropriate field of study
The following correspondence defines well-matched individuals based on their field-of-
study (in italics) and ISCO-08 occupation. This list updates the list by Wolbers (2003)
and Quintini (2011b) to ISCO-08 codes.
 (2) Teacher training and education science: university, higher education, vocational,
secondary, primary, early childhood and other teaching professionals (ISCO
231-235); sports and fitness workers (ISCO 342) and child care workers and
teaches’ aides (ISCO 531)
 (3) Humanities, languages and arts: university, higher education, vocational and
secondary education teaching professionals (ISCO 231-233); architects, planners,
surveyors and designers (ISCO 216); librarians, archivists and curators (ISCO
262); social and religious professionals (ISCO 263); authors, journalists and lin-
guists (ISCO 264); creative and performance artists (ISCO 265); legal, social and
religious associate professionals (ISCO 341) and artistic, cultural and culinary as-
sociate professionals (ISCO 343)
 (4) Social sciences, business and law: directors and chief executives (ISCO 112),
managers (ISCO 121-122, 131-134, 141-143); university, vocational and secondary
education teaching professionals (ISCO 231-233); business and administration
professionals (ISCO 241-243); other health professionals (ISCO 226); legal profes-
sionals (ISCO 261); librarians, archivists and curators (ISCO 262); social and reli-
gious professionals (ISCO 263); authors, journalists and linguists (ISCO 264);
business and administration associate professionals (ISCO 331-335); other health as-
sociate professionals (ISCO 325); legal, social and religious associate professionals
(ISCO 341); clerical support workers (ISCO 411-413, 421-422, 431-432, 441); sales
workers (ISCO 521-524) and street vendors (excluding food) (ISCO 952)
 (5) Science, mathematics and computing: physical and earth science professionals
(ISCO 211); mathematicians, actuaries and statisticians (ISCO 212); life science
professionals (ISCO 213); other health professionals (ISCO 226); university, vocational
and secondary education teaching professionals (ISCO 231-233); Information and
communications technology professionals (ISCO 251-252); physical and engineering
science technicians (ISCO 311); process control technicians (ISCO 313); life science
technicians and related associate professionals (ISCO 314); medical and
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pharmaceutical technicians (ISCO 321); financial and mathematical associate
professionals (ISCO 331) and information and communications technicians
(ISCO 351-352)
 (6) Engineering, manufacturing and construction: engineering professionals (ISCO
214); electrotechnology engineers (ISCO 215); architects, planners, surveyors and
designers (ISCO 216); university, higher education and vocational education teaching
professionals (ISCO 231-232); information and communications technology profes-
sionals (ISCO 251-252); physical and engineering science technicians (ISCO 311);
mining, manufacturing and construction supervisors (ISCO 312); process control
technicians (ISCO 313); ship and aircraft controllers and technicians (ISCO 315);
regulatory government associate professionals (ISCO 335); information and
communications technicians (ISCO 351-352); building and housekeeping su-
pervisors (ISCO 515); crafts and related trades workers (ISCO 711-713, 721-
723, 731-732, 741-742, 751-754); plant and machine operators and assemblers
(ISCO 811-818, 821, 831-835) and labourers in mining, construction, manufac-
turing and transport (ISCO 931-933)
 (7) Agriculture and veterinary: life science professionals (ISCO 213); veterinarians
(ISCO 225); university, higher education and vocational education teaching
professionals (ISCO 231-232); life science technicians and related associate profes-
sionals (ISCO 314); medical and pharmaceutical technicians (ISCO 321); veterin-
ary technicians and assistants (ISCO 324); other health associate professionals
(ISCO 325); skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers (ISCO 611-613, 621-
622, 631-634); food processing and related trades workers (ISCO 751); other craft
and related workers (ISCO 754); mobile plant operators (ISCO 834) and agricul-
tural, forestry and fishery labourers (ISCO 921)
 (8) Health and welfare: life science professionals (ISCO 213), health professionals
(ISCO 221-227); university and higher education teaching professionals (ISCO
231); primary school and early childhood teachers (ISCO 234); social and religious
professionals (ISCO 263); health associate professionals (ISCO 321-325); legal, social
and religious associate professionals (ISCO 341); other personal service workers
(ISCO 516); personal care workers (ISCO 531-532) and protective services workers
(ISCO 541)
 (9) Service: professional services managers (ISCO 134); sales, marketing and public
relations professionals (ISCO 243); other health associate professionals (ISCO 325);
administrative and specialised secretaries (ISCO 334); regulatory government
associate professionals (ISCO 335); legal, social and religious associate professionals
(ISCO 341); artistic, cultural and culinary associate professionals (ISCO 343); clerical
support workers (ISCO 411-413, 421-422, 431-432, 441); service and sales workers
(ISCO 511-516, 521-524, 531-532, 541); drivers and mobile plant operators (ISCO
831-835); cleaners and helpers (ISCO 911-912); food preparation assistants (ISCO
941); street and related service workers (ISCO 951) and street vendors (excluding
food) (ISCO 952)
 Coded as missing: all self-employed workers and those who majored in “general
programmes”; armed forces occupations (ISCO major group 0); legislators and
senior officials (ISCO 111) and refuse workers and other elementary workers
(ISCO 961-962)
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Appendix 2
6.2 Field saturation and field transferability
Table 3 Field saturation across countries
Field saturation
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Austria 0.3 −0.5 0.0 −1.2 1.1 −0.4 −0.5 −0.9
Canada 0.2 0.9 −0.7 0.7 −0.3 −1.2 −0.1 −1.2
Cyprusa, b 0.3 1.1 −0.8 0.9 0.2 −1.2 −0.7 −1.2
Czech Republic 0.9 0.6 −0.3 −1.0 1.1 0.8 −0.9 −0.8
Denmark 0.7 0.4 −0.5 −0.1 0.2 −0.4 −0.3 −0.8
England/N. Ireland (UK) −0.1 5.1 −0.4 1.3 0.0 −1.0 −0.6 −1.6
Estonia 0.1 0.1 −0.5 −0.5 0.4 0.1 −0.5 −0.9
Finland 0.1 −0.2 −0.3 −1.1 0.7 −0.3 0.3 −1.1
Flanders (Belgium) 0.5 0.6 −0.7 0.8 0.7 −0.5 0.2 −1.4
France −0.2 0.0 −0.6 0.5 0.1 −0.2 0.1 −0.6
Germany −0.1 −0.3 0.0 −0.5 1.0 −0.8 0.3 −1.2
Ireland 0.4 1.1 −0.3 1.9 0.2 −0.4 −0.1 −1.1
Italy −0.3 3.1 −0.6 1.4 −0.2 −0.2 −0.5 −1.1
Japan 2.0 1.6 −0.9 −0.9 0.2 −0.4 −0.5 −1.4
Korea −0.1 1.6 −0.9 2.8 0.2 −0.1 −0.5 −1.5
Netherlands 0.3 −0.5 −0.2 −0.1 0.5 −0.1 0.5 −1.4
Norway 0.0 0.1 −0.3 0.1 1.2 −0.7 −0.2 −1.4
Poland 0.5 1.0 −0.7 0.2 0.9 −0.3 −0.8 −0.7
Russian Federationc 1.1 1.1 −1.0 0.4 0.4 0.3 −0.8 −1.0
Slovak Republic 0.7 0.9 −0.7 0.3 0.8 1.1 −0.5 −0.5
Spain 0.1 1.9 −0.4 1.0 0.6 −1.0 −0.1 −1.4
Sweden 0.4 0.4 −0.2 −0.8 0.7 −0.4 0.0 −1.3
USA 0.8 1.0 −0.4 1.3 −0.3 −1.3 0.2 −1.2
Country average 0.4 0.9 −0.5 0.3 0.5 −0.4 −0.3 −1.1
Source: Own calculations based on the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) (2012)
(2) teacher training and education science, (3) humanities, languages and arts, (4) social sciences, business and law, (5)
science, mathematics and computing, (6) engineering, manufacturing and construction, (7) agriculture and veterinary, (8)
health and welfare, (9) service. a, b, c See notes to Table 1
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